“While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him.”
— Attributed to Fyodor Dostoevsky in the 1999 report The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism
Introduction
The epithet to this essay is less a reflection of what Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881) actually said — as it remains unverified but frequently cited — as it is of what the Russian author’s novels continue to offer us: an understanding of the evildoer. His novel Crime and Punishment is known for its harrowing depiction of the mind of an ideological murderer. This essay asks the question: do his predictions about ideological radicalization hold true for the most seemingly-inexplicable crimes of our day, namely suicide terrorism? Though many explanatory theories already exist for so-called Islamist terrorism, it remains the case that such crimes — even as they become more frequent — continue to shock and confuse the general Western public. This essay suggests that literature can aid in humanizing these criminals, and Dostoevsky’s novels are particularly adept at this because of their explorations of the interplay between ideologies and human nature. For though much of literature has attempted to explain why people commit murder, the issue of ideological murder, which is not driven by passion, direct self-interest, or personal retribution, is much more complex.*
This essay will show that Dostoevsky attempts to give us answers to three questions that relate to terrorism: What kind of idea can drive a person to murder? What kind of person can be so driven by an idea? And in what kind of social setting can such a process take place? Dostoevsky’s answers, as will be seen, often accurately predict the motivations observed in modern-day terrorists.
I. The Idea
In this section I will show that both Crime and Punishment’s Raskolnikov and the modern Islamist terrorist attempt to justify their crimes to themselves and to the public through utilitarian arguments that give their crimes a moral impetus. As we will see, these justifications are self-contradictory and they ultimately cannot fully explain the crimes nor the decisions of the criminals to engage in them.
Raskolnikov’s overarching utilitarian justification is presented when he recalls overhearing a student and an officer discussing the same idea that had occurred to him when he met the old moneylender: that perhaps someone should kill her, take her vast wealth, and distribute it to the thousands of poor and wretched throughout the city of St. Petersburg, thereby saving thousands of lives. “Kill her and take the money, so as to devote yourself afterwards to the service of all humanity and the common cause.” The student in the tavern calls this idea “simple arithmetic.” At hearing this, Raskolnikov is “in a state of extreme agitation,” astounded at the coincidence of how “those very same thoughts had just been conceived in his own mind.” Months pass and this “strange idea” stews in his mind. He debates with himself, going this way and that until finally, “his casuistry was now as sharp as a razor blade and he could no longer find within himself a single conscious objection.” He had thoroughly convinced himself that such an act was “not a crime.”
According to Dostoevsky scholar Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky exaggerated Raskolnikov’s beliefs in order to represent “all the potentially dangerous hazards contained in [the ideas of the Russian radicals].” And similarly, the modern so-called Islamist terrorist is most often not someone that Muslims would “recognize themselves in.” Several explanatory theories for the modern phenomenon of terrorism exist, and the most widespread of these is, of course, that the religion of Islam itself is the primary cause of such violence. Even the term ‘moderate Muslims’ suggests that Islam is inherently an extremist faith and that it requires ‘moderate’ adherence in order to practice it peacefully. Subsequent calls to reform Islam by media and politicians across the United States and Europe have proliferated.
The data, however, show that religious knowledge and adherence is not a key factor in predicting radicalization, and in fact may be negatively correlated. According to MI5’s Behavioral Science Unit, most British terrorists do not have an in-depth knowledge of religion and are described as “religious novices.” They often did not grow up in religious households and have weak ties to local religious communities. Mosque attendance is negatively correlated with sympathy with terrorists, and strong religious knowledge can be a deterrent to radicalization. The Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point found that the majority of ISIS recruits had “no formal religious education and had not adhered to Islam for their entire lives.” In addition, prior to their radicalization or even after, they often behaved in ways that are contradictory to the Islamic orthodoxy for which they claim to fight, such as drinking, smoking, taking drugs, or visiting prostitutes.
Clearly religion plays some role in uniting members of such organizations and providing a discourse of moral superiority. But it is also plain that, at the very least, religious arguments alone provide insufficient justification. So-called Islamist terrorists, and other violent extremists, are instead motivated by very clear utilitarian purposes — rather than primarily religious ones — which, over a period of radicalization convince them of their moral superiority. The University of Chicago’s Professor Robert Pape compiled the largest database on suicide terrorism around the world from the 1980s to the mid-2000s. He neatly summarizes the terrorist’s utilitarian justification in his 2005 book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism:
“there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any of the world’s religions. […] Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”
This is the murderous logic employed by the modern terrorist: that to kill a small number of innocent civilians could motivate world powers, who might otherwise be impossible to influence, to withdraw from conflicts that cost many more lives. ISIS propaganda exemplifies this justification. Their conception of ‘homeland’ is the lost caliphate, an idealized notion of the Islamic world that extended from Spain to Southeast Asia centuries ago. This is the mythic homeland that they seek to rebuild and from which they want to expel Western influence. Their consistent use of the term ‘Crusaders’ to describe the West reveals an intent to cast Western governments as active invaders who bring suffering for Muslims. This justification is remarkably similar to that of Raskolnikov’s: kill a few to save many. It allows the terrorists to view themselves as the heroes of this story.''
As we saw with Raskolnikov’s crimes and as we see with modern terrorism, “Islamist” or otherwise, the criminals often end up harming those that they claim to be fighting for. Raskolnikov murdered Alyona's sister Lizaveta, because she happened upon him during the crime. Similarly, terrorists that claim to be fighting to end Muslim suffering often achieve just the opposite. Muslims themselves are the victims of these crimes in the vast majority of cases. And their increasing frequency leads to hate crimes against Muslims and is used by Western governments as justification for further military intervention and ‘security’ measures that encroach on the rights of Western Muslims.
The idea, then, that can drive a person to utilitarian murder is one that places the criminal himself in the morally superior position. But importantly, as Frank notes, Raskolnikov’s radicalization relied on more than just the superior logic of his justification — this is especially clear when noting how quickly Raskolnikov lost sight of his humanitarian aims for the murdered woman’s wealth. Rather, the entire process was only made possible by his “fierce and self-absorbed egoism,” his “innate extremism,” and “a desire for self-sacrifice bordering on martyrdom.”
II. The Person
In this section, I will explore Dostoevsky’s insight into the more subtle psychology of ideological murder to show that his characterization of Raskolnikov as a socially-alienated and egotistically driven young man is similar to that of the modern terrorist.
In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov’s initial revulsion towards his murderous intentions is slowly subdued under the weight of the true explanation for why he murdered: an egoistic search for self-validation. The first part of the novel, before the murder, largely follows Raskolnikov’s inner conflict between his “intention to commit a crime in the interests of humanity” and “the resistance of his moral conscience against the taking of human life.” Frank argues that Dostoevsky’s heart-wrenching depiction of “the agonies of a conscience wrestling with itself” has “no equal this side of Macbeth.”
As readers, we see Raskolnikov struggle with the murderous idea and his own revulsion towards it when he realizes, “he [had] grown used to perceiving his ‘hideous’ dream as an actual venture, while still not believing his own intentions.” He asks himself “but will that really happen? Surely it can’t, can it?” Closer to the murder, he wakes from a nightmare and exclaims, “My God! Will I really — I mean, really — actually take an axe, start bashing her on the head, smash her skull to pieces? [..] Lord, will I really?” Raskolnikov even has moments when he entirely turns away from his “strange idea” asking God for help to “show me my path, while I renounce this damned … dream of mine!” The gradual breakdown of Raskolnikov’s innate humanity and compassion, which manifests in his growing revulsion towards the average people around him, stands at odds with his supposedly humanitarian aims. It also reveals the process by which ideology comes to be distorted in the mind of an alienated individual such that it justifies behaviors that are at odds with its fundamental principles.
As for the egoism that drove Raskolnikov to commit his crime, Dostoevsky gradually reveals this underlying psychology until even Raskolnikov himself realizes that his supposedly humanitarian reasons were not his true motivators and confesses to Sonya, “Listen: I wanted to become a Napoleon, that’s why I killed..” He continues, “It wasn’t to [..] make myself a benefactor of humanity. Nonsense! I just killed. I killed for myself, for myself alone.” Raskolnikov was driven by acute self-doubt and insecurity that made him need “to find out [..] was I a quivering creature or did I have the right…?” For if he, Raskolnikov, could bring himself to disregard the most basic human injunctions against murder, than he could count himself among the class of men that Napoleon occupied: men who are able to justify their crimes and are later glorified for them as “masters of the future.” We now finally understand that the utilitarian ideals which seemed to motivate Raskolnikov were contradicted both by his unsympathetic thoughts and actions and his underlying egoistic search for self-validation.
Frank adds to this understanding by arguing that Raskolnikov’s nature is inherently extreme and that he has innate desires for heroism and self-sacrifice. One such example of Raskolnikov’s desire for heroic martyrdom is his previous insistence on marrying the daughter of his landlord despite her great disabilities and lower social standing and over the wishes of his family. He saw this as an opportunity for him to act in a way that made him seem the noble hero, and was willing to do it though it also came at the cost of his own happiness and freedom. We later see Raskolnikov when two men are at the door of the apartment where he has just murdered Alyona and Lizaveta. He stands on the other side holding the axe that is dripping blood, and his cold rationalism is suddenly overcome by an urge to “yell at them, to argue with them, stick his tongue out at them, tease them, laugh, roar, roar, roar with laughter!” This is the moment, according to Frank, when his megalomania truly takes over. It becomes obvious to us as readers and witnesses, that Raskolnikov’s engagement with his distorted ideology has brought out his egoistic and extreme nature and truly overridden his humanity, as Dostoevsky understands it.
The similarity here to modern terrorists in terms of a culture of heroic martyrdom and a search for self-validation is quite clear. According to the University of Chicago’s Dana Rovang, ISIS filmmakers mimic well-known Hollywood narrative techniques in order to cast their fighters as heroes and martyrs. One propaganda video about a militant named Abu Muslim, for example, follows a twelve-step plot progression known as ‘The Hero’s Journey.’ Peter Bergen, who studied 300 cases of convicted terrorists or sympathizers in the United States, also highlights the appeal of heroic martyrdom, and says for example:
“Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two brothers who carried out the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, was a nonpracticing Muslim who became an Islamist militant once his dreams of becoming an Olympic boxer faded. At the time of the attack, he was unemployed. For him, bombing the marathon seemed to allow him to become the heroic figure that he believed himself to be.”
Raskolnikov, too, was unemployed and had his student dreams thwarted by economic hardship at the time of his radicalization. Despite coming from diverse educational backgrounds, most British terrorists work in low-grade jobs, suggesting thwarted aspirations that may lead to a loss of direction and a need for validation. MI5 claims that joining a terrorist group can be appealing for people looking for stronger “self-esteem” and a “sense of control.” The intimate psychology of indiscriminate murder found in Crime and Punishment helps us to understand what may be going on in the minds of some such criminals when innate compassion is gradually made subordinate to distorted ideologies and egos.
III. The Social Setting
In this section I argue that Dostoevsky’s cautionary tale should prompt us to re-examine the social conditions that contribute to the rise of ideological crimes. Frank argues that we should understand Dostoevsky as a writer who responded to pressing social conditions and emerging ideas. His key talent was “this ability to integrate the personal with the major social-political and cultural issues of his day.” Jürgen Habermas, one of the foremost theorists of modernity, argues that the modern project will fail, unless we have “an awareness of what is missing” in our societies which leads people to a constant search for meaning and purpose in their lives. This meaning was previously provided by religion, but was pushed out in in the West in favor of Enlightenment rationalism and individualism. Weber called this process ‘disenchantment.’ Talal Asad similarly describes the concept of the modern secular as that by which all events are reduced to purely material causes and stripped of any higher meaning. This disappearance of meaning in everyday life is a fundamental element of modern Western societies.
The search for personal meaning is also at the heart of Raskolnikov’s crimes, as has been shown, and it seems likely that it animates crimes of modern terrorists as well. For although there is a tendency to perceive groups like ISIS as backwards or even “medieval,” their projects are actually only made possible by the social conditions, ideas, and technologies — like the internet and modern weaponry — that have emerged during the modern period. Young, socially-alienated men with little meaning in their lives are particularly susceptible to the heroic narratives they are told by online recruitment networks. The search for meaning is part of what drives them to such extreme acts. Even Raskolnikov was influenced by a growing sense that the path he was on is what he was meant to be doing. When chance occurrences seemed to point him towards the murder, he thought it was “as if there really were something preordained in it all, some sign…”
In this way, Dostoevsky manages to weave into his narrative an element of coincidence and unpredictability that is also typical of Islamist terrorism. For just as we can’t fully predict who will be radicalized or when or where attacks will occur, there were often moments when Raskolnikov could have turned back but was spurred on by events of random chance that implied metaphysical purpose. This occurred most prominently just before the murder when he turned away from his “damned dream” and prayed for guidance. And yet what returns him to the path of murder, and perhaps what solidifies the act for many unsure would-be murderers and terrorists, is the sudden appearance of a clear path, an opportunity to carry out their ‘strange’ ideas.
Raskolnikov was finally able to subdue his conscience when he serendipitously learned “that the very next day, at such-and-such a time, such-and-such a woman — the object of an intended murder — would be home alone.” And it is this knowledge which eventually leads him to her apartment the next day with an axe hidden in his clothes and a supposedly humanitarian sanction to murder.
Conclusion
Over a century before the first modern terrorist attack, Fyodor Dostoevsky explored the psychology of egoism, social alienation, and murder through his character Raskolnikov from the novel Crime and Punishment. Dostoevsky sheds a more human light on three fundamental elements of modern terrorism: the idea or the driving force, the person behind the terrorist, and the surrounding social conditions. His portrait of an egoistically-driven and socially-alienated young man, intoxicated by a utilitarian justification and the promise of heroism, has remarkable parallels with what we now know of the modern terrorist. This essay is not meant to argue that we necessarily learn more about terrorists from reading literature, for all of the information cited above was already available outside of this context. However, divergent explanatory theories persist, and noting the remarkable accuracy of Dostoevsky’s predictions can help us to arbitrate between them. Dostoevsky’s novel also helps us to humanize the experience of radicalization. Raskolnikov’s journey is an intimate experience for the reader, and he is not an entirely unsympathetic character, as opposed to the figure of Svidrigailov, for example. Therefore, reading Crime and Punishment can be an exercise in truly understanding the “evildoer” as our epithet has asked us to do.
This analysis may also provide an opportunity for self-reflection on the part of our entire society. For though we need not accept Dostoevsky’s social prescription of a return to the Russian Orthodox Church, it is clear that his critiques of modernization are enduring, since the social problems he warned of persist. And this acknowledgement provides an important opportunity to return to the question and finally address “what is missing.”
*Note: For analyses of such motivation I have turned to statistical surveys of terrorism conducted by academics and national security groups over the past decade. English-language discourses around terrorism focus on self-professed Muslim groups in the United States and Europe, as does the available research by academic and national security groups. This essay concentrates on these groups also, while noting that white extremist groups have caused more deaths in the U.S. since 9/11 and are cited by American law enforcement agencies as a more alarming threat to national security. Additionally, this essay’s emphasis on attacks that occur in Western Europe and the United States should not indicate that these victims are more worthy of solidarity than others, but rather that attacks that are perpetrated by Westerners are of particular interest to this essay. This is because the social conditions relevant to Dostoevsky’s analysis are more similar than those of other regions that suffer from terrorism, particularly when such regions experience war and other broad social traumas that may contribute to violence.
Iman Masmoudi is a senior at Harvard University who researches how colonialism and modernity have transformed traditional Islamic education. In addition to activism, she believes in prayer, family, and all things cute and cuddly as forces with the power to change the world.